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CASE COMMENT
DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSE NOT A RESTRAINT ON ALIENATION
OF PROPERTY
Occidental Savings & Loan Association v. Venco Partnership,
206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980)
Holding that a due-on-sale clause' does not restrain alienation of
property, the Nebraska Supreme Court, in Occidental Savings & Loan
Association v. Venco Partnership,2 adopted a unique position among
the states concerning exercise of the due-on provision by lending
institutions.3
Plaintiff, Occidental Savings and Loan Association, loaned money to
Venco Partnership and executed a promissory note providing that if the
borrower violated any condition of the mortgage that secured payment
of the note, the loan association could declare the remaining indebted-
ness due and payable.4 The mortgage contained a due-on-sale clause
stating that in the event of sale of the property without the lender's
consent, the lender could accelerate the loan. Upon transfer of the
property that was security for the loan, Occidental accelerated the debt
pursuant to the loan agreement. Following defendant's failure to pay
off its remaining indebtedness, Occidental sought foreclosure of the
mortgage.6 The Nebraska district court found that the due-on clause
was valid and enforceable and ordered foreclosure of the mortgage.
7
The Nebraska Supreme Court on appeal affirmed and held: A due-on-
sale clause in a mortgage contract neither directly8 nor indirectly9 re-
strains alienation of property and is therefore an enforceable contrac-
tual provision absent a showing by the mortgagor that enforcement
1. See note 38 infra and accompanying text.
2. 206 Neb. 469, 479, 293 N.W.2d 843, 848 (1980).
3. See notes 67-82 infra and accompanying text.
4. Petition for Foreclosure of Mortgage at 1, Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Part-
nership, No. 744-160 (Neb. Dist. CL April 2, 1979), aff'd, 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980).
5. Id. at 2.
6. Id.
7. Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, No. 744-160, slip op. at 3 (Neb. Dist.
Ct. April 2, 1979), afd, 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980).
8. 206 Neb. at 473, 293 N.W.2d at 845. See notes 70-71 infra and accompanying text.
9. 206 Neb. at 479, 293 N.W.2d at 848. See notes 72-73 infra and accompanying text.
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would produce an inequitable result.10
Since the enactment of the Statute Quia Emptores" in 1290, courts
have consistently held that restraints on the alienation of property12 are
repugnant to the fee simple estate. 3 Free alienability encourages prop-
erty improvement,1 4 dispersion of wealth," and protection of creditors'
rights.16 The broad prohibition encompasses both direct and indirect
inhibitions on sales of property.
Direct restraints restrict or prohibit property owners from transfer-
ring their ownership interest. 7 These restrictions, classified according
to the mechanism by which property transfer is circumscribed, are ei-
ther disabling, forfeiture, or promissory, 8 all of which are per se ille-
10. 206 Neb. at 482, 293 N.W.2d at 850.
11. Stat. 18 Edw. I, c. 1 (1290).
12. See L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FuTuRE INTERESTS § 1115 (2d ed. 1956) [herein-
after cited as SIMES & SMITH]. The Statute Quia Emptores established the rule that no one could
restrict the power to alienate an estate in fee simple. The statute changed the prior policy that
perpetuated the feudal organization by allowing persons to "convey land in fee simple on the
condition that the tenant might not alienate." Smnas & SMITH, supra, § 1114, at 6,
13. An inherent characteristic of a fee is that it is freely alienable. Any restriction on the
transfer is therefore repugnant by definition. See Volkmer, The Application ofthe Restraints on
Alienation Doctrine to Real Property Security Interests, 58 IowA L. REv. 747, 750 (1973). SiMEs &
SMrrH, supra note 12, § 1133, at 19 argues that this is circular reasoning.
14. Ifa landowner could not receive value for his efforts, he might be less likely to invest time
and money for improvements. Free alienation increases community development and increases
taxable values. The restraints on alienation doctrine encourages property improvement because a
land owner who invests time and money to improve the property can sell it and receive value for
his effort. This increases community development and increases taxable values. See Schnebly,
Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests: 1, 44 YALE L.J. 961, 964 (1935). See also Morse
v. Blood, 68 Minn. 442, 71 N.W. 682 (1897).
15. See Bernhard, The Minority Doctrine Concerning Direct Restraints on Alienation, 57
MICH. L. REV. 1173, 1179-80 (1959). See also SimEs & SMITH, supra note 12, § 1117, at 10-11.
The necessity of imposing some restraint on the power of protracting the acquisition of
the absolute interest in, or dominion over property, will be obvious, if we consider, for a
moment, what would be the state of a community in which a considerable portion of the
land and capital was locked up. That free and active circulation of property, which is
one of the springs as well as the consequences of commerce, would be obstructed; the
improvement of land checked; its acquisition rendered difficult; the capital of the country
gradually withdrawn from trade; and the incentives to exertion in every branch of indus-
try diminished.
Id. (quoting T. JARMAN, WILLS 219 (2d ed. 1843)).
16. The restraints on alienation doctrine protects creditors by allowing them to foreclose on
property in the event the borrower defaults on payments. Bernhard, supra note 15, at 1180;
Schnebly, supra note 14, at 964.
17. SIMEs & SMrrH, supra note 12, § 1131.
18. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 404, at 2381 (1944) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATmENT].
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gal. A disabling restraint 19 prevents a transferee from conveying land.
A forfeiture restraint2" denies the grantee his estate upon any attempt
to dispose of the property; under a forfeiture clause, the grantor creates
a reversion or a gift in favor of a third party in the event the property is
alienated. A promissory restraint2' imposes contractual liability on the
conveyee for breach of his agreement with the conveyor not to transfer
property.
In contrast, an indirect restraint 22 occurs as a result of an attempt to
accomplish something other than the restraint of sale. Direct restraints
limit the power to alienate, but indirect restraints inadvertently give
rise to inalienability by the creation of a less marketable estate. 23 Most
indirect restraints are legally unobjectionable. 24 Certain indirect re-
straints, however, are unreasonable and are controlled or prohibited by
law. For example, the rule against perpetuities25 limits the creation of
contingent or executory future interests26 and indestructible trusts,27 all
of which are indirect restraints.
Courts are divided in their evaluation of the exceptions to the direct
restraints doctrine. Most courts28 consider restraints on alienation ac-
cording to well-defined exceptions, 29 following the format of the Re-
19. Examples of language creating a disabling restraint are: "that the conveyee shall not
have the power to alienate,. . . the privilege of transferring, or that a transfer shall be null and
void, or that the land shall not be subject or liable to conveyance, or that he shall not sell or that
the land shall not be sold .... " Sits & SmIrrH, supra note 12, § 1136, at 21-22. Disabling
restraints are the worst possible restraints because they "enable the person restrained to deny the
validity of his own conveyance and also... deny his creditors resort to the property interests
which he is enjoying." RESTATEmENT, supra note 18, § 405, at 2390.
20. RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 404(l)(c), at 2381.
21. Id. § 404(l)(b), at 2381.
22. SisEs & SMrrH, supra note 12, § 1116, at 9-10.
23. Id § 1201, at 88-89.
24. Id.
25. While the doctrine against restraints on alienation operates on direct restraints, the rule
against perpetuities restricts the creation of future interests that cannot vest within a life or lives in
being and twenty-one years. Id. § 1222, at 106-08. The rule does not eliminate all future interests
but prohibits the creation of interests that are too remote. Id. § 1117, at 13.
26. Id. §§ 1235-1237.
27. Id. §§ 1391-1395.
28. See, e-g., Hinshaw v. Wright, 124 Kan. 792, 262 P. 601 (1928); Wright v. Jenks, 124 Kan.
604, 261 P. 840 (1927); Nebraska Nat'l Bank v. Bayer, 123 Neb. 391, 242 N.W. 115 (1932). See
generaly Manning, The Development ofRestraints onAlienation Since Gray, 48 HARv. L. REv. 373
(1935).
29. Professor Bernhard criticizes the majority view as both over- and underinclusive. It is
overinclusive in that courts may sometimes uphold restraints that are unreasonable and, con-
versely, restrictions that are reasonable may not fall within one of the accepted categories of rea-
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statement of the Law of Properly.30 These exceptions, or restraints that
are prima facie reasonable, are categories in which the social benefits
outweigh the repugnancy of the restraint.3 1
The land vendor contract is a well-recognized exception to the cate-
gory of promissory restraint32 because, over time, courts have con-
cluded that the validity of its purpose outweighs its impact on
alienability. This type of contract prevents a vendee from transferring
property before he possesses the deed. Although the vendee has equi-
table title, the vendor retains legal title until the debt is paid. The con-
tract does not unduly restrain alienation because the contract provision
relates directly to protection of the vendor's security interest. The ven-
dee is free to transfer the property once he fulfills his contractual
obligations.33
sonable restraints. In Professor Bernhard's view, the majority approach causes courts to carve out
a greater number of exceptions and "water down" the majority test. The better approach is to
determine reasonableness on a case by case basis. Bernhard, supra note 15, at 1186.
30. The Restatement recognizes a group of valid restraints---exceptions distinguished by a
reasonableness standard. According to the Restatement, a promissory or forfeiture restraint is
void unless "(b) the restraint is qualified so as to permit alienation to some though not all possible
alienees, and (c) the restraint is reasonable under the circumstances, and (d) if the restraint is a
forfeiture restraint, the requirements of the rule against perpetuities are satisfied." RESTATEMENT,
supra note 18, § 406, at 2393.
31. Generally, disabling restraints are void whether they apply to fee simple estates, estates
for years, life estates, or fee tails. Courts, however, recognize the spendthrift trust as one exception
to the rule prohibiting disabling restraints. The reason for this exception is that the conveyor
wants to assure the continuing support of the conveyee. It is easy to make this exception because
"the trust itself hinders alienability as a practical matter .... Secondly, persons, dealing with
the owner of an equitable interest are perhaps less likely to place reliance on such ownership than
if a legal interest were involved." Bernhard, supra note 15, at 1181. See also RESTATEMENT,
supra note 18, § 405, at 2391.
Although forfeiture restraints are presumed invalid, courts recognize these restraints if they are
applied to life estates or estates for years or if they create rights of preemption. A restraint is
tolerated on a lesser estate because this type of estate is less marketable than an estate in fee
simple. When a purchaser buys property from a person with a life estate he will own the property
only for the life of the person who has a life estate. For this reason a restraint on a lesser estate
will create no further restraint on alienability. RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 409, at 2421-28.
Promissory restraints are generally void on the theory that a restraint on the practical alienabil-
ity of property is against public policy and contracts against public policy are void. SIMEs &
Smnr, supra note 12, § 1161, at 74. Courts, however, have allowed restraints in the form of
provisions in business organizations, articles prohibiting the transfer of shares, and provisions
protecting the vendor in a land sale contract. See, e.g., Krebs v. McDonald's Ex'x, 266 S.W.2d 87
(Ky. 1953) (transfer of shares); Sloman v. Cutler, 258 Mich. 372, 242 N.W. 735 (1932) (land sale
contracts); Farmer's Mercantile & Supply Co. v. Laun, 146 Wis. 252, 131 N.W. 366 (1911) (provi-
sion in business organization).
32. RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 416, at 2448.
33. Goddard, Non-Asstgnment Pro visions in Land Contracts, 31 MICH. L. REv. 1, 10 (1932).
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Unlike the majority courts that strictly apply the Restatement in re-
straints tests, the minority courts34 analyze the reasonableness of al-
leged restraints on the facts of each case. These courts weigh the social
value of a particular restriction against its impact on alienability.35
The due-on-sale clause is a provision in a mortgage contract, deed of
trust,36 or note secured by a deed of trust that allows a lender to accel-
erate37 the debt if the mortgagor conveys the property without the
lender's consent.38 The clause has two purposes. First, lenders exercise
34. The minority doctrine first gained support in Nebraska and Kentucky. The Nebraska
Supreme Court, in Andrews v. Hall, 156 Neb. 817, 58 N.W.2d 201 (1953), overruled application of
the minority test, holding that any restraint on a fee simple estate is invalid. For Kentucky cases
following the minority approach see Cooper v. Knuckles, 212 Ky. 608, 279 S.W. 1084 (1926).
Some cases recognize the minority approach in dictum. See, eg., Roemhild v. Jones, 239 F.2d 492
(8th Cir. 1957); Commonwealth Realty Corp. v. Bowers, 261 Md. 285, 274 A.2d 353 (1971); Ink v.
Plott, 175 N.E.2d 94 (Ohio App. 1960). See also SimEs & SMITH, supra note 12, § 1150, at 50.
35. Under the minority view courts determine reasonableness on a case approach, using a
balancing test. Because of the uncertainty of the approach, commentators criticize the minority
doctrine arguing that it will encourage litigation. "If a court were to adopt simply a generalized
proposition that any reasonable restraint is valid, it would be impossible, without litigation, to
ascertain the validity of any particular provision." StoEs & SMrrH, supra note 12, § 1150.5, at 11
(Supp. 1981). Persons might be more likely to include a restraint in an instrument if they knew a
court might uphold it under a reasonableness test. Professor Bernhard disputes this argument by
pointing out that Kentucky litigation in the area has not increased significantly more than litiga-
tion in other states. Bernhard, supra note 15, at 1187.
36. A deed of trust is "[ain instrment... by which legal title to real property is placed in
one or more trustees, to secure the repayment of a sum of money or the performance of other
conditions." BLACK'S LAW DicrioNAY 373 (5th ed. 1979).
37. Acceleration in a loan context means that a lender, upon breach of conditions in the loan
instrument, can call due the remaining indebtedness of the loan. Id. at 12.
38. A typical due-on-sale clause states, "should the mortgagor sell, transfer or dispose of the
mortgaged property or any part thereof, without the written consent of the mortgagee, then the
mortgagee shall have the right, at its option, to declare all sums secured by the mortgage to be
immediately due and payable." Volkmer, supra note 13, at 768. Examples of transfers which
operate to accelerate the remaining indebtedness are "(a) the transfer of title or possession by
outright sale, sale on land contract, or lease; and devise, descent or distribution upon death... "
Dunn, Enforcement fDue-on-Tranwfer Clauses, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. 891, 893 (1978).
The due-on encumbrance clause is a second kind of due-on provision. Encumbrance clauses
enable lenders to accelerate payment of the remaining indebtedness when a mortgagor further
encumbers the property by engaging in secondary financing. For a distinction between the due-
on-sale and the due-on-encumbrance provisions see LaSala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5
Cal. 3d 864, 880, 489 P.2d 1113, 1123, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 859-60 (1971); Volkmer, supra note 13, at
780. But see Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 949-50, 582 P.2d 970, 973-75, 148
Cal. Rptr. 379, 383 (1978). See also Medovoi v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 152 Cal. Rptr. 572,
583-84 (1979) (Thompson, J., concurring).
For a general discussion of the due-on-sale clause see Cohen, Judicial Treatment ofthe Due-on-
Sale Clause: The CaseforAdopting Standards of Reasonableness and Unconscionabilitfy, 27 STAN.
L. Rv. 1109 (1975); Flaherty, Illinois Land Trusts and the Due-on-Sale Clause, 65 ILL. B.J. 376
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the clause to protect their security interest in the property against waste
or default by preventing a buyer with a bad credit record from assum-
ing the mortgage.39 Second, lenders use the clause to shorten the effec-
tive term of mortgages, enabling them to maintain their loan portfolios
at current rates in times of rising interest4u
(1977); Comment, Mortgages-A Catalogue and Critique on the Role of Equity in the Enforcement
of Modern-Day "Due-on-Sale" Clauses, 26 ARK. L. REV. 485 (1973); Comment, The Due-on-Sale
Clause as a Reasonable Restraint on Alienation-A Proposalfor Texas, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 514
(1976); Comment, Debt Acceleration on Transfer of Mortgaged Property, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 584
(1975); 47 Miss. L.J. 331 (1976).
39. See, eg., Peoples Sav. Ass'n v. Standard Indus., 22 Ohio App. 2d 35, 36-37, 257 N.E.2d
406, 407-08 (1970). Lenders fear a buyer who may allow property to deteriorate and thereby
decrease in value. If the value diminishes and the buyer defaults on payments then the lender
may be unable to satisfy his claim from the proceeds at a foreclosure sale. See Bonanno, Due on
Sale and Prepayment Clauses in Real Estate Financing in California in 2imes of Fluctuating Interest
Rates--LegalIssues andAlternatives, 6 U.S.F.L. REv. 267, 275 (1972). See also Cohen, supra note
38, at 1115.
Lenders investigate the financial stability of borrowers before making loans. This investigation
includes researching a borrower's "income, employment, credit standing, and general financial
condition." Dunn, supra note 38, at 894. In some transactions the lender will undertake a more
rigorous investigation and consider the "borrower's experience in similar circumstances, its man-
agement capabilities, financial stability, sources of capital and business associates." Id. By fol-
lowing this procedure lenders hope to assure themselves of loaning capital to creditworthy
borrowers. The due-on-sale clause offers continued protection to lenders upon transfer of prop-
erty to potentially financially unstable buyers. See note 92 infra and accompanying text.
40. Under most circumstances the mortgagee will not consent to the transfer of the property
unless the new buyer agrees to renegotiate the mortgage at a higher interest rate. This rate, how-
ever, is usually less than the market rate at the time of the transfer. See generally Note, Use of
"Due-on" Clauses to Gain Collateral Benqfrs: A Commonsense Defense, 10 TULSA L. REv. 590
(1975).
Protecting the lender against changes in the money market generates the most controversy for
courts in deciding whether enforcement of the due-on clause by state chartered institutions is
valid. State courts that accept the lender's economic interest argue that the effect of not enforcing
the clause is to increase interest rates. In order to attract savings customers who supply the loan
capital, savings and loan companies must increase dividends, thereby increasing the cost of money
to the association. These factors reduce the money available for new loans. The increase in the
cost of money to the association is passed on to borrowers in the form of higher interest rates. Id.
at 593.
The Bank Board, which regulates federally chartered institutions, strongly supports use of the
due-on clause for the lender's economic protection. Federal associations receive their funds from
short term sources such as passbook savings accounts, certificate savings accounts, and advances
from the Federal Home Loan Bank system. The funds are invested in long term loans. "The
difficult problem of borrowing short and lending long has been aggravated by the fact that in the
post-war years the cost of funds to savings and loan associations, on balance, has been constantly
increasing, and savings and loan associations... operate on a very thin margin of profit.. .."
Advisory opinion of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board at 21, Schott v. Mission Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, No. CIV-75-366-WMB (C.D. Cal. July 30, 1975). Economic analysis shows that the
cost of funds to the savings and loan associations is increasing faster than portfolio yields. For this
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss3/16
Number 3] DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSE 1053
Although many courts recognize that the due-on clause does not fit
directly into any category described in the Restatement, they assert that
the clause resembles a promissory restraint.41 The due-on clause is a
contractual provision that may affect the practical alienability of prop-
erty when financing is difficult to obtain. Other courts assume without
analysis that the clause indirectly restrains alienation and enter judg-
ments based on the reasonableness of enforcement.
42
After concluding that the due-on clause restrains alienation of prop-
erty, courts differ on the issue of reasonableness. 43 All jurisdictions up-
hold use of the clause as reasonable when lenders exercise it to protect
themselves from transfers to uncreditworthy buyers.' Although courts
are split on the issue of enforcement when state chartered institutions
seek to force renegotiation at higher interest rates,45 at least one court
has upheld discretionary use by federally chartered associations on
post-1976 agreements." Congress directed the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board to pursue policies that support the financial health of
member associations.47 In 1976 the Bank Board adopted regulations
reason the Board has determined that the due-on clause is necessary to protect federally chartered
institutions. Id. at 22.
41. See, eg., Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 III. 2d 119, 124-26, 333 N.E.2d 1, 4
(1975).
42. "If the mortgage clause defendant seeks to enforce can be labeled a restraint on aliena-
tion only by expanding the restatement definition, we do not hesitate to stretch the term to include
this 'due-on-sale' clause." Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 166-
67, 250 N.W.2d 804, 806 (1977). See Crocket v. First Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620,
224 S.E.2d 580 (1976). See also First Commercial Title Inc. v. Holmes, 550 P.2d 1271 (Nev. 1971);
Dunn, supra note 38, at 901.
43. See notes 53-55 infra and accompanying text.
44. Id.
45. See notes 54, 56 infra and accompanying text.
46. In Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1978), the
district court held that federal law preempts state law on the validity of due-on clause enforcement
in loan instruments executed after 1976. Id. at 912. For a discussion on procedural problems
concerning federal court jurisdiction over claims brought against federally chartered savings and
loan associations see O'Connell, The Due-on-Sale Clause in Florida 4 Potential Battlegroundfor
Borrowers andLenders, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 933, 955-56 (1980). For a discussion of due-on clause
enforcement in pre-1976 agreements see note 49 infra.
47. In 1932 Congress created the Federal Home Loan Bank Act to alleviate the emergency in
home financing caused by the depression. 12 U.S.C. § 1421 (1976). The Bank Act created the
Home Loan Bank Board, a federal agency that was directed to (1) set up twelve banks to serve as
wholesale banks for member institutions, and (2) make mortgage loans directly to members of the
public. There was no improvement in the system and over 40% of all home loans were in default.
Brief of Federal Home Loan Bank Board as Amicus Curiae at 6, First Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1980).
In 1933 Congress established the Home Owners Loan Act (HOLA) to provide relief from home
Washington University Open Scholarship
1054 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 59:1047
that allow federal institutions to enforce the clause.48 When federal
and state law conflict, federal law preempts contrary state regulation of
due-on clause enforcement.49
mortgage indebtedness, amend the Bank Act and, most important, to create a system of federal
savings and loan associations. 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976 & Supp. 1111979). See Schram v. Welton,
35 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Mich. 1940); Prato v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 24 F. Supp. 844 (D. Mass.
1938), rev'd on other grounds, 106 F.2d 128 (1st Cir. 1939); Bealkowski v. Powers, 310 IM. App.
662, 35 N.E.2d 386 (1941); Walker v. Oakley, 347 Pa. 405, 32 A.2d 563 (1943). See also T.
KENDALL, THE SAViNGS AND LoAN BusiNEss 6 (1962).
As part of the federal system Congress gave the Bank Board plenary power over the creation
and regulation of federal associations. Under § (a) of the HOLA the Bank Board is directed to
regulate federal institutions by giving authority to the best practices of local mutual thrift institu-
tions in the United States. The Bank Board was to examine the practices of state institutions and
select what it considered to be the best practices in order to achieve a uniform system of national
regulation. Section (a) provides in part:
In order to provide local mutual thrift institutions in which people may invest their funds
and in order to provide for the financing of homes, the Board is authorized, under such
rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to provide for the organization, incorporation,
examination, operation, and regulation of associations to be known as "Federal Savings
and Loan Associations", . . . and to issue charters therefor, giving primary considera-
tion to the best practices of local mutual thrift and home-financing institutions in the
United States.
12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (Supp. Il 1979).
48. One area of federal institutions that the Bank Board regulates is the contract between the
association and its borrowers. In 1976 the Bank Board specifically adopted amendments authoriz-
ing use of the due-on clause. The 1976 amendment provides in part:
A Federal association continues to have the power to include as a matter of contract
between it and the borrower, a provision in its loan instruments whereby the association
may, at its option, declare immediately due and payable all of the sums secured by the
association's security instrument if all or any part of the real property securing the loan is
sold or transferred by the borrower without the association's prior written consent....
[S]uch an acceleration option (hereinafter called a due-on-sale clause) shall be governed
exclusively by the terms of the contract between the association and the borrower ....
§ 545.6-11(f), 41 Fed. Reg. 18,288 (1976).
49. See Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1978). Accord,
Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 377 F. Supp. 11, 17 (N.D. I1. 1974).
See also Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1974); Green-
wald v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 446 F. Supp. 620 (D. Mass. 1978); Rettig v. Arlington
Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Il. 1975).
The supremacy clause, article 6, section 2, of the United States Constitution, grants Congress
the power to preempt any legislative field over which it has jurisdiction. The Constitution states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the land, and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2. Congress may either implicitly or explicitly preclude state regulation.
See Brief of Federal Home Loan Bank Board as Amicus Curiae, First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Under the occupation of the field theory, if
Congress acts on a subject in which the federal interest is dominant, courts conclude that the
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federal legislature left no room for concurrent state regulation even though Congress did not spe-
cifically declare its intent to preclude state law. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-
26 (1977) (federal law regulating meat inspection permitting reasonable variations in statement of
package weight preempts state law requiring that package weight not be less than that stated on
label); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) (federal law
regulating airport noise preempts local control--reasonable inference that Congress left no room
for states to supplement federal law). See also DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976); Campbell v.
Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961).
The HOLA is evidence that Congress intended to preempt state regulation of federal associa-
tions. Congress directed the Bank Board to give primary consideration to the best practices of
state law to create a uniform system of federal regulation. It is impossible to conclude from this
directive to the Board that Congress left room for concurrent state regulation. To do so would
have perpetuated in the federal system the state practices HOLA was designed to eliminate.
"[C]ourts have upheld the authority of the Board on the basis that the plenary powers given to
the Board in the HOLA clearly evidence a Congressional intention to preempt the field, thus
precluding any regulation of federal associations by state law." Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Bd., 377 F. Supp. 11, 17 (N.D. IlM. 1974).
The Bank Board's 1976 amendment explicitly states the Board's intention to exclusivel, regulate
the use of the due-on-sale clause in federal associations. See Preamble to 12 C.F.R. § 545-6-I l(f).
See also Brief of Federal Home Loan Bank as Amicus Curiae at 29, First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
Although prior to 1976 the Bank Board did not specifically regulate use of due-on-sale clauses
by federal associations, the Bank Board interpreted an earlier 1948 regulation to authorize such.
See Advisory Opinion of Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., Resolution No. 75-647, Schott v. Mission
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. CV-75-366-WMB (C.D. Cal. July 30, 1975). The 1948 regulation
broadly stated that a loan contract between the association and its customers shall fully protect
Federal Associations.
Section 545.6-11 provides:
(a) Required and authorizedprovisions. Each loan shall be evidenced by note, bond, or
other instrument ... as in keeping with sound lending practices. The loan contract shall
provide for full protection to the Federal association in accordance with applicable pro-
visions of law, applicable governmental rules and regulations ....
40 Fed. Reg. 20,942-43 (1975).
In Schott v. Mission Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. CV-75-366-WMB (C.D. Cal. July 30, 1975),
the district court interpreted the 1948 regulation as authorizing use of the clause by the federal
association to maintain its loan portfolio at current rates. The court ordered the Bank Board to
consider the affidavits and economic analysis of both parties to determine whether the regulation
was intended to authorize use of the clause by federal associations.
In 1975 Bank Board economists evaluated the material and issued a formal ruling that the 1948
regulation authorized federal associations to use the due-on clause for their economic protection.
Advisory Opinion of Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., Resolution No. 75-647, Schott v. Mission
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. CV-75-366-WMB (C.D. Cal. July 30, 1975). Although courts pre-
sume the validity of an administrative agency's interpretation of its regulation unless the interpre-
tation is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute or contrary to public policy, Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945); Kupiec v. Repub-
lic Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 512 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1975), whether federal law preempts contrary
state regulation in the area of due-on clause enforcement prior to 1976 is unsettled. See also
Derenco, Inc. v. Benjamin Franklin Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 281 Or. 533, 577 P.2d 477 (1978);
Kaski v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 72 Wis. 2d 132, 240 N.W.2d 367 (1976).
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Courts applying state law adopt either the majority50 or minority"1
restraints tests to determine whether the due-on clause is reasonable.
Under the majority approach, courts analogize the due-on provision to
the land vendor contract exception described in the Restatement *52
These courts automatically enforce the clause53 regardless of the
lender's motive,54 unless the claimant proves that enforcement in a par-
50. See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text.
51. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 111. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
We see little difference in the end to be promoted by the restraint contained in the mort-
gage in this case from the end which is recognized as a legitimate object of protection by
a restraint contained in a contract for sale of land. Section 416 of the Restatement of the
Law of Property states that a restraint imposed by a vendor on the interest of a vendee
under a contract for sale of land is valid. The restraint is imposed primarily for the
protection of the security interest of the vendor.
Id. at 121, 333 N.E.2d at 4.
53. Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 303, 509 P.2d 1240, 1245
(1973) (protecting lender from inflationary conditions in money market reasonable grounds for
enforcing due-on clause); Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 I. 2d 119, 126, 333 N.E.2d
1, 4-5 (1975) (protecting lender's interest in property is valid and clause is automatically enforcea-
ble without consideration of facts of particular case); Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Van
Glahn, 144 N.J. Super. 48, 54, 364 A.2d 558, 561 (1976) (acceleration clause is valid term in
contract and automatically enforceable even for maintenance of lender's loan portfolio--transfer
of equitable title sufficient to invoke clause); Poydan, Inc. v. Agia Kiriaki, Inc., 130 N.J. Super.
141, 149, 325 A.2d 838, 842-43 (1974) (reasonable for creditors to reserve right to determine whom
they will accept as debtor in possession of milk license, restaurant, and property); Shalit v. Inves-
tors Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 101 N.J. Super. 283, 289, 244 A.2d 151, 155 (1968) (due-on clause reason-
able restraint on alienation); Stith v. Hudson City Say. Inst., 63 Misc. 2d 863, 867, 313 N.Y.S.2d
804, 808 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (automatically enforceable in recognition of lender's economic interests in
protecting loan portfolio at current interest rates); Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289
N.C. 620, 631, 224 S.E.2d 580, 587 (1976) (enforceable without showing of impairment to lender's
security interest); People's Say. Ass'n v. Standard Indus., Inc., 22 Ohio App. 2d 35, 38, 257 N.E.2d
406, 407-08 (1970) (clause permitting lender to treat transfer of property without lender's consent
as default entitling lender to balance due was automatically enforceable); Gunther v. White, 489
S.W.2d 529, 532 (Tenn. 1973) (increased rate of interest to protect economic interest of lender a
valid reason for enforcing contractual provision); Miller v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
86 Wash. 2d 401, 406, 545 P.2d 546, 549 (1976) (provision allowing lender to increase interest rate
automatically enforceable absent showing of unconscionability); Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 71 Wis. 2d 531, 538-39, 239 N.W.2d 20,23-24 (1976) (contractual provi-
sion allowing acceleration automatically enforceable absent showing of laches).
54. Many courts that automatically enforce the clause specifically recognize lenders' interests
in maintaining their loan portfolios at current rates as well as their interest in protecting their
security from waste and depreciation. See Malouffv. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo.
294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973); Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Van Glahn, 144 N.J. Super. 48, 364
A.2d 558 (1976); Stith v. Hudson City Say. Inst., 63 Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct.
1970); Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976); People's
Say. Ass'n v. Standard Indus. Inc., 22 Ohio App. 2d 35, 257 N.E.2d 406 (1970); Gunther v. White,
489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973); Miller v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401. 545
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ticular case is unconscionable.
An increasing number of jurisdictions, however, apply the minority
doctrine to determine whether the clause is reasonable under the cir-
cumstances. 5 Under the minority test the due-on clause is not prima
facie reasonable. Lenders must prove that the clause is necessary to
protect their security interest in the property. These courts assert that
the clause unreasonably restrains alienation when lenders exercise it to
protect their loan portfolios in response to the problem of long-term
commitments in an inflationary market. 6
Recent California decisions illustrate the movement of courts toward
application of the minority restraints test in the area of due-on clause
enforcement.17 The California Supreme Court in Wellenkamp v. Bank
P.2d 546 (1976); Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 71 Wis. 2d 531, 239
N.W.2d 20 (1976).
55. First S. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Britton, 345 So. 2d 300 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977) (threat of
acceleration to increase interest rate where there exists no jeopardy to security interest is not a
reasonable ground for enforcement); Patton v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 473, 578
P.2d 152 (1978) (exercise of due-on clause by beneficiary in deed of trust unreasonable without
showing of impairment to security interest); Lane v. Bisceglia, 15 Ariz. App. 269, 488 P.2d 474
(1971) (mortgagee cannot condition consent to transfer on buyer's assumption of loan at increased
interest rate from 6% to 6-%%); Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190
(197 1) (lender must show impairment to security interest in order to foreclose on mortgage); Tuck-
er v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974) (due-on
clause in installment contract unreasonable restraint on alienation where there was no showing
that contract between borrower and borrower's tenants injured lender's interests); LaSala v.
American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971) ("due-on-
encumbrance" clause permitting acceleration if borrower executes junior encumbrance unreason-
able restraint on alienation where second lien poses no threat to lender's security); Demey v.
Joujon-Roche, 63 Cal. App. 3d 46, 133 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1976) (due-on clause not enforceable where
security interest was not impaired because original purchaser remained liable on note and there
was little possibility of waste to desert land); Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1970) (foreclosure denied where no harm resulted to mortgagee); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804 (1977) (clause unreasonable restraint on
alienation where sole basis for exercise is to maintain lender's loan portfolio); Sanders v. Hicks,
317 So. 2d 61 (Miss. 1975) (unreasonable restraint on alienation absent showing by lender of
threat to legitimate interest); Continental Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013 (Okla.
1977) (unreasonable for mortgagor to impose fee as condition precedent to giving consent to trans-
fer where there was no provision for fee in contract); Bellingham First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Garrison, 87 Wash. 2d 437, 553 P.2d 1090 (1976) (lender justified in refusing consent to transfer
because person assuming loan had bad credit rating); Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. American
Medical Servs., 66 Wis. 2d 210, 223 N.W.2d 921 (1974) (due-on clause not enforceable where no
impairment to lender's security interest).
56. See cases cited note 55 supra.
57. See generaly The Supreme Court of Calfornia 1974-1975, 64 CAL. L. REv. 239, 573-601
(1976).
In Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964), the first
Washington University Open Scholarship
1058 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 59:1047
case to examine the validity of the due-on-sale clause in California, the court held the provision
enforceable as a reasonable restraint on alienation. Id. at 317, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at
508. In Minderhout, the plaintiff bank made loans to the Enrights, who executed a promissory
note for their indebtedness. Two months later, the Enrights signed a separate instrument agreeing
not to transfer certain property without the lender's consent until the full indebtedness was paid.
Under the agreement, the bank had the option, upon default of any condition in the agreement, to
declare the remaining indebtedness due and payable.
The Enrights subsequently sold the property without the lender's consent. The bank, after at-
tempting to collect the unpaid balance, brought an action to foreclose the equitable mortgage. Id.
at 313, 392 P.2d at 266, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 506. The Enrights argued that the agreement did not
create an equitable mortgage and that, even if it did, the agreement would be invalid because it
contained a restraint on alienation. Id. at 314, 392 P.2d at 267-68, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 507-08. The
court decided in favor of flexible application of the restraints doctrine in cases involving valid
interests of the parties and stated that it was reasonable for the lender "to condition its continued
extension of credit to the Enrights on their retaining their interest in the property that stood as
security for the debt." Id. at 317, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
Professor Volkmer commented that it is unclear whether the Minderhout opinion supports the
majority or minority view. He resolved the confusion in favor of the majority interpretation be-
cause the California Supreme Court mentioned other restraints that courts have considered rea-
sonable----e., the spendthrift trust, executory land contract, and lease for a term of years. "Since
Justice Traynor did not elaborate the factors which made the challenged restraint reasonable,"
Professor Volkmer reasoned, "the implication is that the creditor-debtor relationship itself is a
satisfactory basis for imposing a due-on-sale clause." Volkmer, supra note 13, at 774-75.
Automatic enforcement of the due-on clause was approved in Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969), where the court of appeals posited two
primary business reasons for the use of the clause. First, the court recognized the risk of loss to the
lender from possible harm to property that is security for a loan. The lender has a valid interest in
preventing a transfer to irresponsible buyers who may waste the property, thereby decreasing the
security to a value less than the indebtedness on the loan. Id. at 579, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 138. Second,
the court recognized the lender's risks when interest rates fluctuate. When rates are low, a bor-
rower can refinance his loan at a lower rate of interest and prepay the existing loan. When interest
rates rise, however, a lender cannot increase the rate on an outstanding loan to match inflation,
except when the initial borrower terminates his interest in the property. Id. Thus, the court held,
"[t]here is no inequity visible from such a provision." Id. See also Hellbaum v. Lytton Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 274 Cal. App. 2d 456, 79 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1969) (due-on clause not unreasonable restraint
on alienation); Jones v. Sacramento Say. & Loan Ass'n, 248 Cal. App. 2d 522, 56 Cal. Rptr. 741
(1967) (due-on clause not unreasonable restraint on alienation).
The California courts began a gradual retreat from automatic enforcement of the due-on clause
in LaSala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
The court in LaSala distinguished the due-on-encumbrance clause from the due-on-sale clause,
rejecting automatic enforcement of the former. Id. at 879-80, 489 P.2d at 1122-23, 97 Cal. Rptr. at
858-59.
In LaSala plaintiffs borrowed funds from the defendant savings and loan association, executing
promissory notes and trust deeds that contained due-on-encumbrance provisions. Each plaintiff
then borrowed additional funds from third party individuals, securing these additional loans with
the same property. The defendant notified the parties of its right to accelerate the loans and
offered to waive the right if each party paid a small fee and agreed to an increased interest rate on
the first deed of trust. Id. at 869-70, 489 P.2d at 1115-16, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 851-52. The California
Supreme Court concluded that the reasoning in Minderhout and Cherry did not justify upholding
the due-on-clause in encumbrance situations. Id. at 879-80, 489 P.2d at 1122-23, 97 Cal. Rptr. at
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of America,58 ended that state's automatic enforcement of the due-on
clause59 by institutional lenders.6° The court reasoned that the clause
has the practical effect of restraining alienation. When money is un-
858-59. While a sale of property divests its owner of all responsibility for maintaining the lender's
security interest, the owner in an encumbrance situation maintains title to and possession of the
property. In the event of foreclosure, the first loan has priority over the second and hence the
encumbrance creates no additional risk to the first lender. Id. The court held that the due-on-
encumbrance clause would be valid under Minderhout principles if the lender utilized the provi-
sion to prevent harm to its security interest. The lender, however, must prove likelihood of harm
in each case. The court explicitly stated that it would be unreasonable for the lender to exercise
the clause solely to achieve economic gain. Id. at 884, 489 P.2d at 1124-25, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 860-
61.
In Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1974), the California Supreme Court relied on LaSala's application of the minority doctrine to
test the validity of the due-on clause in installment contracts. The court introduced the quantum
of restraint test, judging the actual restraining effect of the clause against the presumed benefit to
the lender. In applying this analysis to a sale by installment contract, the court contrasted the
installment sales transaction with outright sales of property. In an outright sale, the seller relin-
quishes legal title to and possession of the property. In an installment sale, however, the original
borrower retains legal title until the installment buyer pays off the debt for the land. Thus, the
legal owner has an incentive to insure that the installment buyer protects the property from waste
and depreciation. Id. at 638, 526 P.2d at 1174-75, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638-39. As in LaSala, Tucker
rejected improvement of the lender's economic position as a valid reason for enforcement of the
due-on-sale provision. Id. at 639 n.10, 526 P.2d at 1175 n.10, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639 n.10.
58. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978). In Wellenkamp, the court ex-
tended the reasoning in Tucker and LaSala to outright sales of land. In Wellenkamp, the Mans
purchased property and borrowed $19,100 at eight percent annual interest from the defendant
bank, executing a promissory note secured by a deed of trust. The deed of trust contained a due-
on-sale clause that provided for acceleration of the debt in the event the trustor conveyed the
property without the consent of the mortgagee. The Mans sold the property to the plaintif, Wel-
lenkamp, for the "difference between the total selling price to plaintiff and the balance outstand-
ing on the Mans' loan . I..." ld. at 946, 582 P.2d at 972, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 381. The defendant
bank agreed to waive acceleration if the plaintiffs assumed the loan at a higher interest rate.
Plaintiffs refused to pay an increased rate and the bank filed notice of default, electing to sell
under the deed of trust. Plaintiffs filed an action seeking an injunction against enforcement of the
clause arguing that the provision unreasonably restrained alienation of property. Id. at 946-47,
582 P.2d at 972, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 381. The Supreme Court of California held the due-on clause
unenforceable in an outright sale unless the lender "can demonstrate that enforcement is reason-
ably necessary to protect against impairment to its security or the risk of default." Id. at 953, 582
P.2d at 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
59. See note 57 supra. See generally Note, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America: A Victoryfor
the Consumer?, 31 HASTINGS LJ. 275 (1979); Note, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America: Exercise of
Due-on-Sale Clauses as an Unreasonable Restraint Upon Alienation, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 722
(1979).
60. The California Supreme Court limited its holding to institutional lenders, leaving open
the question of whether courts could enforce the due-on-sale clause in private transactions. Wel-
lenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 952 n.9, 582 P.2d 970, 976 n.9, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379,
385 n.9 (1978). Accord, Medovoi v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 152 Cal. Rptr. 572, 581 (1978).
See also Zeller, The Due-on Clause after Wellenkamp: Unresolved Issues, 1980 CAL. B.J. 76.
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available for new financing, enforcement of the due-on clause elimi-
nates one available means for buyers to finance purchases. If a lender
agrees to renegotiate an existing loan only at an increased interest rate,
the seller may be forced to lower the purchase price or may refuse to
sell. The court stated that the clause therefore inhibits practical aliena-
bility.6I The court then applied the reasonableness test to the facts of
the case by measuring the effect on alienation against the factors ad-
vanced in justification of the restraint.62 In an outright sale,63 a seller
may have neither possession nor legal title. This does not necessarily
increase the risk that an assuming buyer will commit waste to property
or default on payments under the assumed mortgage contract.64 Fur-
thermore, the California court held that enforcing the clause to enable
a lender to renegotiate interest rates with an assuming buyer is always
unreasonable. Inflation is foreseeable, and lenders should consider it in
their loan transactions.65
The Nebraska Supreme Court in OccidentalSavings & Loan Associa-
tion v. Venco Partnership66 held that the due-on clause neither theoreti-
cally67 nor practically 68 restrains alienation, and consequently it never
reached the issue of reasonableness. Relying on the Restatement,69 the
court reasoned that under the definition of direct restraints, the due-on
provision theoretically does not prevent alienation because it does not
61. In such circumstances, if the lender is unwilling to permit assumption of the existing
loan, and instead elects to enforce the due-on clause, transfer of the property may be
prohibited entirely, because the buyer will be unable to substitute a new loan for the loan
being called due, and the seller will not receive an amount from the buyer sufficient to
discharge that loan, particularly when the balance due is substantial.
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 950, 582 P.2d 970, 974-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379,
383-84 (1978).
62. The court adopted the quantum of restraint test applied in Tucker. Id. at 951, 582 P.2d at
975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
63. The California Supreme Court in LaSala and Tucker distinguished between an encum-
brance and installment sale and an outright sale in deciding the reasonableness issue. Wel-
lenkamp eliminated the prior distinctions insofar as treatment of the due-on clause is concerned
and defined outright sale to mean transfer of legal title. See note 57 supra.
64. Although the original borrower no longer retains an interest in the property, the assum-
ing buyer has equity in the property. The assuming buyer's interest provides adequate incentive
to maintain the property's value. Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 952, 582 P.2d
970, 975-76, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 384-85 (1978).
65. Id. at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
66. 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980).
67. Id. at 472, 293 N.W.2d at 845.
68. See id. at 478, 293 N.W.2d at 848.
69. Id. at 472, 293 N.W.2d at 845. See notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text.
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qualify as a disabling, forfeiture, or promissory restraint.70 The clause
does not void a later conveyance, terminate the ownership interest
upon conveyance, or impose contractual liability on a conveyor for
breaching an agreement not to convey. A conveyance of property
under a mortgage that contains a due-on clause does not prevent the
mortgagor from transferring the property7 but only affects his right to
transfer the mortgage.
In addressing the question of practical alienability, the court rea-
soned that an indirect restraint by definition applies to any restriction
that affects sales.72 This application, however, is overly broad. Al-
though the clause may impede a sale if a prospective buyer cannot
obtain financing, courts should not consider every impediment to a sale
a restraint on alienation. Building restrictions, zoning restrictions, and
covenants in deeds that require landowners to dedicate property for
residential purposes are valid restrictions that may impair marketabil-
ity, but they do not restrain alienation."
After concluding that the due-on clause is not a restraint on aliena-
tion, the court criticized the California court's decision in Wellenkamp
for relying on policy rather than legal authority.74 The Wellenkamp
court had concluded that the due-on clause was invalid on the basis of
its view of social need and the assumed effect of the clause on the mort-
gage industry.
The Occidental court further argued that the Wellenkamp decision
unreasonably burdens lenders.75 Not only does invalidating the clause
call into question any device that lenders may use to protect their loan
70. Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 472, 293 N.W.2d 843,
845 (1980).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 473-79, 293 N.W.2d at 846-48.
73. Id.
74. The decision is based primarily on considerations of social need and the assumed
effect of a "due on sale" clause in the marketplace. The rights and needs of the seller, as
seen by the court, are detailed and balanced against the rights and needs of the lender, as
seen by the court. The court concludes that the rights and needs of the seller outweigh
those of the lender, notwithstanding the fact that the parties have freely entered into a
contract on the contrary.
Id. at 476, 293 N.W.2d at 847. In addition, the court found Wellenkamp inconsistent because
Wellenkamp distinguished between the validity of enforcing a due-on clause by an institutional,
as opposed to a private, lender. Id. See note 60 supra.
75. Occidental Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 477,293 N.W.2d 843,
847 (1980).
Number 3] 1061
Washington University Open Scholarship
1062 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
portfolios from fluctuations in the money market,76 but it also prevents
lenders from obtaining the benefits of their loan contracts. Lenders
need some mechanism to protect their portfolios against rising interest
rates. Savings and loan associations' assets are invested long-term,
while short-term demand savings accounts and certificates provide the
funds necessary to make loans.77 As the cost of obtaining deposits
rises, lenders are unable to maintain a balanced portfolio.
In addition, the Occidental court asserted the freedom of parties to
contract. A court should not declare a contract contrary to public pol-
icy unless it is unmistakably unconscionable.7" In this case, the court
examined the due-on-sale clause within the context of the total mort-
gage agreement. The mortgage did not contain a prepayment penalty
clause, and the borrower could refinance the loan at a lower rate with-
out charge if the interest rates dropped. It therefore should be reason-
able, if interest rates rise, to allow the lender to increase the rate when
the borrower sells the property.79 Unless a lender has the opportunity
to renegotiate the loan agreement upon sale, a borrower can obtain a
premium by selling the property along with a low interest rate mort-
gage at the lender's expense."0
The court concluded its discussion by conceding that due-on clauses
produce inequitable results in particular cases."1 A court of equity may
fashion an appropriate remedy when the mortgagor has pleaded and
proved facts showing unconscionability. Excluding these circum-
stances, the due-on-sale clause is a valid device to protect lenders from
unprofitable mortgage assumptions.8 2
The Nebraska court correctly held that the due-on clause is enforcea-
76. If the due-on-sale clause restrains alienation, then courts may also interpret variable in-
terest rate and short-term rollover mortgages as restraints because their impact on the market is
the same as that of the due-on clause. Id. at 477-78, 293 N.W.2d at 847-48. For definitions of
variable interest rate mortgages and short-term mortgages see note 94 infra and accompanying
text.
77. Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 480, 293 N.W.2d 843,
849 (1980).
78. Id. at 479, 293 N.W.2d at 848.
79. Id. See also Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580
(1976).
80. The loan association's goal is to derive benefit from the sale of the property rather than to
give the benefit to the borrower. Savings and loan associations anticipate an average turnover of
mortgages after eight years on a twenty year mortgage. See Cohen, supra note 38, at 1109.
81. Occidental Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 480, 293 N.W.2d 842,
849 (1980).




ble on both legal and policy grounds. The clause is not a restraint on
alienation when viewed from the technical perspective of direct re-
straints8 3 or from the more practical perspective of indirect restraints. 84
Under the direct restraint categories, a promissory restraint is a con-
tractual provision requiring the conveyee to meet certain conditions
before the property is sold.85 Courts consider the land vendor contract
exception reasonable under the majority test86 because, although it stip-
ulates performance before a sale is permitted, its requirements are rea-
sonable in the context of the buyer-seller relationship. The due-on
clause, however, imposes no prior conditions on a sale. Rather, where
a loan agreement contains a due-on sale clause, the sale of property
triggers the contractual repayment obligation,87 in effect marking the
termination of a specific agreement between the mortgagor and mort-
gagee regarding specific property. The clause, therefore, is not a re-
straint on alienation, and courts need not reach the issue of
reasonableness under either the majority or minority tests.
The Nebraska court correctly rejected the argument that the clause is
an unlawful, indirect restraint on alienation.8 8 The widespread practice
of sellers transferring mortgages along with their property gives the
due-on clause the appearance of a restraint because the clause limits
one available means of financing a sale. If a seller is prevented from
transferring his mortgage, and a prospective buyer cannot obtain
financing, the clause may impede the sale. This is a result of general
economic conditions and not the due-on-sale clause.89 Landowners
challenging enforcement of the due-on-sale clause, however, are frus-
83. See notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text.
84. See notes 22-27 supra and accompanying text.
85. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
86. See notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
87. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
88. See notes 72-73 supra and accompanying text.
89. The dissenting justice in Wellenkamp stated that:
If a loan exists on the property with a due-on clause, no increased restraint on selling
results if the lender cannot accept the proposed buyer, the situation then being the same
as in the case of the unavailability of funds to the proposed buyer. If the lender will
permit assumption but only at an increased interest rate, again no increased restraint
results because without the existing loan the buyer would be required to pay the higher
interest rate and the seller may be required to compromise his selling price. There is thus
no increased restraint on alienation beyond that inherent in the economic condition pos-
tulated by the majority.
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 956, 582 P.2d 970, 979, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 388
(1978) (Clark. J., dissenting).
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trated not because they are unable to sell their property, but because
they are unable to enjoy the profits of transferring a pre-inflation con-
tract in an inflation wrought economy.90 When courts hold the clause
invalid, sellers with low interest mortgages are able to receive more for
their property than sellers without such mortgages can receive. 91
Finally, on policy grounds, the due-on-sale clause should be enforce-
able absent a showing by the mortgagor of unconscionability. The
clause terminates the mortgage agreement when the lender is no longer
assured of the security of the property. When courts hold the due-on
clause unenforceable, they reverse the traditional relationship between
lender and borrower in which the borrower is responsible for establish-
ing credit as a prerequisite for negotiating a loan.92 This creates a situ-
ation in which the lender is forced to contest creditworthiness of
potential transferees in costly litigation to protect its security interest.
Additionally, the due-on-sale clause mitigates the double bind situa-
tion of lenders in an inflationary market. Borrowers are able to refi-
nance loans when interest rates fall but lenders must wait for loan
repayment before raising interest rates in response to increases in the
cost of money.93 Prohibition of the due-on provision makes long-term
agreements far riskier for lenders. This additional risk has two effects
on consumers. Lenders will raise interest rates to protect against uncer-
tainty and will also resort to novel loan instruments, such as short-term
loans and variable interest mortgages, that ultimately reduce flexibility
in addressing consumers' needs.94
90. See cases cited in notes 53-57 supra.
91. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
92. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
93. The original borrower would be placed at an advantage over the lender if not for enforce-
ment of the clause. The original borrower can transfer the existing mortgage, gaining a competi-
tive advantage in the selling market. If there is a drop in interest rates the borrower can pay off
the entire loan and refinance at a lower rate. Hence, absent enforcement of the clause, the bor-
rower is at an advantage in times of both high and low interest rates. See Crockett v. First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 626, 224 S.E.2d 580, 585 (1976). See note 79 supra and accom-
panying text.
94. Short-term loans are issued for shorter terms with options to renew. In an effort to pro-
tect themselves from fluctuations in the interest rate, savings and loan associations readjust the
rate to the current rate at the time of renewal. Variable interest rate mortgages are loans in which
the interest rate is adjusted periodically to correspond to fluctuations in an indicator rate. These
alternatives are less beneficial to the borrower because they deprive him of a permanent standard
interest rate. As inflation increases, loan payments will increase accordingly. See Malouffv. Mid-
land Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 301-03, 509 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (1973). See also
Bonnano, supra note 39, at 302-07; Note, supra note 40, at 592.
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The Nebraska Supreme Court has displayed insight in recognizing
that the due-on-sale clause is not a restraint on alienation of property
but is a restraint on transferability of a mortgage.95 Other jurisdictions,
finding the clause a restraint on alienation, face the policy issue of
whether the clause is reasonable when lenders enforce it to adjust the
interest rate on an assumed mortgage.9 6 The consequence of voiding
use of the clause for this purpose may weaken mortgage consumer
rights by forcing lenders to resort to novel instruments 97 that will place
more of the risk of inflation on the borrower.
95. See notes 8-9, 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
96. See notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text.
97. See notes 76, 94 supra and accompanying text.
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fessor Leff touched many students and faculty during
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qualities. On behalf of his former colleagues on this
faculty and the alumni of Washington University
School of Law who were his students, the Law Quar-
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